Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David E. Yocom; Salt Lake County Attorney; Jerry G. Campbell; Deputy County Attorney.
L. Zane Gill; Law Office of L. Zane Gill, P.C..
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, No. 900112 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2488

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

tAH COURT OF API
BRIEF

.#?
isIO.

I^ALPH TOLMAN,
Appella5<
VS.

SALT LAKE COUNTY £

Appelle*
APPEAL Of ,„
DISTRICT COOST^
*-V*

*\'&
**£

;#;

>AVID E. YOCOM
It Lake County $f
RRY G. CAMPBEI&
puty County AS#e
dOl South Stat#f t
a|lt Lake City, Ut;
lephone: (801)

' 'V:
X-

* * * * *

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * *

RALPH TOLMAN,
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 900112-CA

SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY,

Argument Priority 15

Appellee.
APPEAL OF THE FINAL DECISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * *

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
RALPH TOLMAN
* * * * *

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
JERRY G. CAMPBELL (0555)
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State, #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Telephone: (801) 468-2653

L. ZANE GILL (3716)
Law Office of
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.
A Utah Professional Corp.
50 West Broadway, #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-1046

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

NATURE OF PROCEEDING

1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

None

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT

11

POINT I: THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY AFFIRMING THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL DECISION
SUSTAINING THE TERMINATION OF RALPH TOLMAN
11
POINT II: MR. TOLMAN HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT
TO MINIMUM DUE PROCESS DUE TO HIS PROPERTY INTEREST
IN CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT WITH SALT LAKE COUNTY

14

POINT III: THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO RULE ON APPELLANT'S
MOTION'S REGARDING "NEXUS"

27

POINT IV: THE CSC FAILED TO CONSIDER
MITIGATION OF PENALTIES

38

POINT V: THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IMPOSED
DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR EVENTS THAT WERE THE SUBJECT
OF FORMER DISCIPLINE

47

CONCLUSION

50

ADDENDUM

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES

Page #

Utah Code Annotated Section 6 3-4 6b-16

1, 51

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)

1

RULES
Federal Rules, Rule 61

17

Salt Lake County Policies and Procedures, Policy No. 5715

14, 30

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61

17

CASES
Ashland Oil & Refining Co. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
International Union, Local 11-420, 28 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 874 (Bradley
Arb. 1957)
49
Auburn Faith Community Hospital, Inc. v. California Nurses
Association, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 882 (Killion Arb. 1976) . . . 48
Big K Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah
1984)
12
Burton v. Civil Service Commission, 394 N.E.2d 1168 (111.
1979)

47, 48

Cash v. Industrial Commission, 556 P.2d 827, 27 Ariz. App. 526
(1976)
24
Cleveland
(1985)

Board

of

Education

v.

Loudermill,

105

S.Ct.

1487
15

D.B. v. Division of Occupational Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d
1145 (Utah 1989)
15, 16, 19
Danesev v. Internal Revenue Service, DA 07528090242 (1982)

. 29

Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission,
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983)
12
Douglas v. Veterans' Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313 (1981)

. 38

Durham Hosiery Mills v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers,
Branch 31-A, 24 Lab. Arb. 356 (Livengood Arb. 1955)
49
ii

Gloster v. General Services Administration, 720 F.2d 700 (DC Cir.
1983)
31
Hurley v. Board of Reviews, 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988)

....

12

John Deere Tractor Co. v. United Automobile, Aircraft &
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 838, 12 Lab. Arb.
129 (Updegraff Arb. 1949)
49
Lockner v. Department of Transportation, DC 07528110695 (1983) 17
Malinconico v. U.S. Postal Service. N.Y.O. 7528119213 (1983)

38

Malinconico v. U.S. Postal Service, N.Y.O. 7528119213 (1983)

38

Merritt v. Department of Justice, 6 M.S.P.B. 493 (1981) . . 32-34
Messina v. City of Chicago. 495 N.E.2d 1228 (111. 1986) . . .

48

Michigan Seamless Tube Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local
1900. 24 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 132 (Ryder Arb. 1955)
49
Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Association v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.. 463 U.S. 29 (1983)
14
Muskegon Heights Police Department, 88 LA 675 (BNA) . . . 36/ 38
Norton v. Macev, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969)

30

Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658 (Utah 1988)

13

Parsons v. Department of Air Force. 707 F.2d 1406 (DC Cir. 1983)
29
Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County. 555 P.2d
281 (Utah 1976)
22
Peters v. United States. 408 F.2d 719 (Ct. CI. 1969)

....

Ragland v. Internal Revenue Service. 6 M.S.P.B. 565 (1981)

18

. 16

Risner v. Federal Aviation Administration, 7 M.S.P.B. 342 (1981)
29
Rucker v. Department of Treasury, 6 M.S.P.B. 80 (1981)

...

16

State Department of Community Affairs v. Utah Merit System Council,
614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 19801
15
Stauffer Chemical Co. v. International Union of Operating
Engineers. Local 912. 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 414 (Davis Arb. 1975) 49
iii

Taylor v. Utah State Training School. 775 P.2d 432 (Ut. App.
1989)
11, 12
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co.. 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985)

14

Wolverine World Wide. Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 600.
66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 796 (Herman Arb. 1976)
49
OTHER AUTHORITY
A Guide to Merit Systems Protection Board Law and Practice, by
Peter B. Broida, Section Edition, 1985, Dewey Publications, Inc.,
Washington, D.C
29, 32, 35

iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The

Court

of

Appeals

of

the

State

of

Utah

has

jurisdiction to review final agency actions, orders, or decrees
which are the result of formal adjudicative proceedings through
Utah Code Annotated Sections 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-3(2)(a) and (b).
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from the decision of the Third District
Court affirming the final decision of the Salt Lake County Career
Service Council ("CSC").
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion by

affirming the decision of the CSC sustaining the termination of
Ralph Tolman?
II. Was Mr. Tolman deprived of his right to minimum due
process due to his property interest in continued employment with
Salt Lake County?
III.

Did the CSC commit reversible error by failing to

rule on Appellant's motions regarding "nexus?"
IV.

Did the County Attorney's Office impose double

jeopardy for events that were the subject of former discipline?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the decision of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah affirming the
final decision of the CSC# an inferior tribunal exercising judicial
1

functions.

The CSC sustained the termination of employment of

Ralph Tolman from his position as an investigator with the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Ralph Tolman was originally employed by Salt Lake

County on January 25, 1971 as a deputy sheriff until he began
working for the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office ("CAO") on or
about April 1, 1980.
2.

(656,21-657,9)1

Tolman graduated number one out 29 in his police

academy class.

(643,6-7) During his nine years with the sheriff's

department, Tolman always had above-standard performance appraisals.

(655,9-13)

He also received numerous commendations during

his employment with the CAO investigative unit.
3.
the CAO.
(660,2-10)

(723,8-728,24)

Tolman spent two years on the Arson Task Force for

(661,3-11)

During that two years, he was a supervisor.

While on the Task Force, Tolman received above-

standard ratings and was never disciplined.

(661,3-14)

4. The lowest performance appraisal Tolman ever received
from the county was a 73.
the above-standard rating.

A score of 73 is only one point below
(664,7-15; 329,21-23)

1

Citations to the record give the page, line on which the
reference begins, followed by a (-) to indicate continuous cite to
the page, and line on which the reference ends.
Multiple
references are separated by a semi-colon.
2

5. Tolman had a good reputation as a police officer and
his closest associates as an investigator would have no problem
with his returning to work if he were exonerated.

(477,7-10;

451,18-452,4; 503,10-24; 562,6-13; 605,2-5; 766,23-767,1)
6.

Tolman received a letter giving notice of intent to

terminate his employment with CAO on or about September 8, 1986.
(Exhibit "A".)
7.

Tolman grieved his termination.

This culminated in

a hearing before the CSC conducted over the course of two weeks in
November

1986 which resulted

termination.

in the CSC sustaining

Tolman's

(Exhibit "B".)

8. At the beginning of the hearing the CSC stated that
it was not bound by formal rules of evidence.
an information gathering body.

It saw its role as

(54,5-11) Counsel for Tolman spent

considerable time trying to convince the CSC that this was a
difficult case involving sophisticated issues of law and fact
requiring it to focus on questions of law and make rulings on those
questions.
9.
job.

Tolman never had an alcohol related problem on the

(286,5-7)

Further, at the time he went to work for the

county, Tolman did not abuse alcohol.
10.

(519,17-21)

The CAO Policy maintains that there are times when

investigators are clearly off-duty.

(307,10-20)

The CAO has no

rule prohibiting the off-duty consumption of alcohol, in fact, the
3

Investigators' Division of the CAO had no policy at all regarding
off-duty consumption of alcohol.

(287,8-11; 287,19-22; 308,9-12)

11. The CAO had no consistent policy regarding multiple
arrests or convictions for DUI.
12.

(372,14-17)

Neither the CAO nor Salt Lake County Sheriff's

Department gave training regarding what constituted appropriate
off-duty conduct for an investigator or a deputy sheriff.

(719,

17-25)
13.

Tolman was never warned that his private domestic

disputes would be brought into his work environment and made the
basis of a termination action.
14.

(720,4-10)

Tolman was arrested in 1981 on suspicion of DUI.

(77,4-79,14) He plead guilty to a charge of reckless driving which
resulted in the loss of a previously approved extra meritorious 5%
raise.

(662, 1-19)
15.

Tolman received no clear warning that another DUI

incident would result in disciplinary action.
16.

(105,9-12)

Sometime between 1981 and 1985 at the Sage Lounge,

Midvale City police officers believed Tolman was about to attempt
to drive while intoxicated.
to drive him home.
17.

They had him arrange for his father

He was not arrested.

(112,1-119,12)

In October 1985, a verbal altercation occurred

between Tolman and John Harrington of KTVX news.

4

Although there

was "salty" language used, Tolman never lost control of himself.
(309,18-313,8; 416,6-10; 469,10-20)
18. As a result of the incident with Harrington, Tolman
received the lowest performance appraisal he ever received — 73.
(666,9-667,7) Following the lowering of his performance appraisal
score, the Harrington incident was not mentioned in subsequent
evaluations.

(376,3-11)

19. Tolman's fortune at the CAO dropped in November 1985
as a result of the leak of the Murray fire report.

(675,24-676,6;

676,13-677,15) Don Harmon, Tolman's second level supervisor, told
Bradley Adamson

that

Tolman was

going

involvement in the Murray fire report.

to be

fired

for his

(557,14-558,6)

20. Tolman was involved in an affair with Margo Bergvall
for several years.

Their relationship was volatile.

(171,9-19;

206,23-207,16)
21.

On June 10, 1986, while off duty, Tolman caught

Bergvall and David Nielsen nude and engaging in sex in Bergvall's
hot tub which resulted in a verbal and physical altercation.
(695,17-696,9; 173,7-179,18; 215,10-11)
22.

On the following morning, while still off duty,

Tolman stopped by Bergvall's home.

Another altercation occurred

when Tolman learned that Nielsen had spent the night.
180,7-182,18; 699,21-700,10)

5

(328,1-4;

23.

The altercation between Tolman, Bergvall, and

Nielsen was a domestic matter arising from the affair between
Tolman and Bergvall.
24.

(696,10-698,8)

Tolman spoke of the altercation at his work soon

after the incident. Tolman's supervisor, Sam Dawson, was aware of
the incident yet no action was taken against Tolman until August
1986.

(177,22-23; 268,23-269,1; 705,2-25)
25.

regarding

Bergvall was not contacted by CAO investigators

the June altercation until after August

16, 1986.

(192,19-22; 354,11-19)
26.

In December 1985, a meeting was held in the CAO to

discuss a change in the policy regarding personal use of county
cars. Direction concerning the policy change was confusing at best
and not made available in written form to investigators until seven
months after the meeting.
27.

(308,21; 309,6; 670,7-16; 285,8-25)

Tolman was accused of misusing an office vehicle.

This resulted in a meeting between Tolman and Don Harmon.

Tolman

learned, approximately 30 days later, that he had been secretly
placed on probation.
28.

(449,2-8; 670,18-671,12; 671,13-22)

Harmon admitted to Jim Burns that he was singling

out Tolman on the mileage issue.
29.

(449,24-450,4)

Tolman was considered to be a political foe of Ted

Cannon by some in the office.

Olin Yearby testified that Cannon

told him and Tolman and others that they would be "dead meat"
6

regardless of who won the 1986 primary election
Attorney) in the Republican party.
30.

(for County

(498,3-499,12)

The political pressure in the CAO during the 1986

campaign year became out of hand.

Tolman, among others, was

singled out because of his political involvement.

(761,2-14;

559,22-25; 560,18-22)
31.

Tolman's employment was threatened because of the

Livingston Report (dealing with allegations that Roger Livingston
had

conspired

automobile).

to

commit

insurance

fraud

regarding

a

leased

Cannon let it be known that Tolman was responsible

for leaking the Livingston Report and that he was going to be
fired.

Don Harmon made a similar threat against Tolman for the

same reason.

(450,22-451,10; 435,9-13; 435,17-18)

32.

Cannon appeared on KALL radio on August 15, 1986

and publicly claimed that Tolman had been responsible for leaking
the Livingston Report.
33.

(715,4-15)

Upon hearing Cannon's public accusations Tolman

began drinking and within hours of Cannon's accusations he had been
arrested for DUI.
34.
police status.

(715,18-716,6; 716,13-23)

Tolman did not try to avoid arrest by using his
He eventually plead guilty to reckless driving.

(161,3-5)
35. Other CAO employees were arrested for DUI, but were
not terminated.

After Tolman's arrest, Dawson solicited any and
7

all incriminating evidence against Tolman,

(98,9-22; 162,20-

163,11; 275,21-276,9; 370,13-22; 437,3-5; 629,17-630,6; 746,20747,14)
36.

The CAO asked for a report on the years-old Sage

Lounge incident after the August 16, 1986 DUI arrest.

(367,12-

368,9-21)
37.

The August 16, 1986 DUI arrest was not enough on

its own merits to terminate Tolman.

(352,21-353,12)

38. According to Dawson, neither the car mileage issue,
the Sage Lounge incident, nor the Harrington incident were enough
to sustain Tolman's termination.
39.

(352,6-12; 353,13-14; 352,2-5)

The CSC allowed the CAO to present the unsworn

statement of David Nielsen as evidence through Sam Dawson over the
vigorous objections of counsel for Tolman.
appear before the CSC.

Nielsen refused to

The CSC refused to obtain a court order

compelling Nielsen to appear.

Counsel for Tolman advised the CSC

that it was committing reversible error by allowing the CAO to
carry its burden of proof on the basis of hearsay.

(233,2-240,20;

238,5-240,16)
40.

As a result of the CSC's rulings concerning David

Nielsen, counsel for Tolman moved that the proceedings be dismissed
with prejudice because of the prejudicial hearsay allowed. The CSC
ruled that it was not bound by legal rules and allowed Dawson to
testify on behalf of Nielsen.

(242,20-243,1; 244,15-23)
8

41.

Counsel for Tolman conducted no cross examination

of Dawson while he testified for Nielsen.
42.

Harmon interviewed Bergvall concerning the June 10

and 11 incidents with Tolman.
interview.

(260,1-9)

A tape recording was made of that

During a pre-hearing conference, counsel for Tolman

made a motion

for administrative

discovery

of all

interview

transcripts concerning the June 10 and 11 incidents. The Bergvall
transcript was never obtained by Tolman.

(270,16-22; 12,14-19,6)

43. During the same pre-hearing conference, counsel for
Tolman raised the issue of "secret" personnel files asking for a
ruling

that

Tolman

be

given

access

to

all

personnel

file

information that was to be used in the hearing or that any such
secret information not be allowed in the hearing.
both requests.

who told

The CSC refused

(12,14-33,8; 33,9-34,17)

44.

Dawson refused to turn over the names of the people

him

about

the Bergvall

incident

claiming

executive

privilege and obligation to keep the information in confidence.
The CSC allowed him to do this.
45.

The

CSC

(355,1-356,25)

ignored

Tolmanfs

prehearing

regarding the concepts of nexus and double jeopardy.

motions

(37,3-44,11)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At issue in this case are several questions.

The chief

among them are questions of law. The proper standard of review to
be applied is one of "correction of error". This standard does not
9

require this court to defer at all to the judgment of the CSC or
the district court. Even if the strictest standard of review, were
applicable here —

that applied to questions of fact —

the result

is the same. This court should reverse Tolman's termination. Many
facts were considered in reaching the decision to affirm the CAO's
termination of Tolman that should not have been allowed for
consideration.
Tolman's employment as an investigator with the CAO was
terminated in 1986.

He received a hearing before the CSC which

was in turn appealed to the third district court.

Tolman did not

receive due process throughout this procedure.

The CAO was

permitted to refer to documents and records which were denied to
Tolman.

Additionally, crucial testimony was admitted under very

questionable circumstances.

The unsworn statement of a witness

was allowed to be read into the record by a CAO investigator. The
witness was available.
appear.

He simply chose to ignore the order to

Such questionable procedure resulted in the violation of

Tolman's constitutional right to due process.
The CSC wrongfully received and considered evidence of
Tolman's activities which were not prohibited by the County.

The

CAO neglected to comply with the nexus rule. Evidence was admitted
against Tolman without a specific connection being made between
Tolman's behavior and the efficiency of the CAO.
to rule on Tolman's motions concerning nexus.
10

The CSC refused

Furthermore, even if there were justification of the
imposition of a penalty, the penalty of termination should have
been mitigated substantially downward*

Considering, among other

things, Tolman's past work and disciplinary record; the consistency
of the penalty in relation to that applied to others and to the
table of penalties; the lack of impact of the offense on the CAO;
the general lack of notice of the violation of any rules, and
Tolman's potential for rehabilitation, termination of Tolman's
employment was too severe.
Finally, the CAO based its decision to terminate Tolman,
at least in part, on past actions for which Tolman had already been
disciplined.
misconduct.

The CAO may not punish Tolman twice for the same
Discounting the actions for which Tolman had already

been disciplined and the actions for which the CAO could not comply
with the nexus rule, Tolman could not be terminated. None of his
actions, standing on their own, were enough to lead to termination.
By allowing the CAO to punish Tolman a second time for earlier
misconduct, Tolman was wrongfully terminated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY AFFIRMING THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL DECISION
SUSTAINING THE TERMINATION OF RALPH TOLMAN.
In a recent case from the Utah Court of Appeals,

Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 775 P.2d 432 (Ut. App. 1989),
filed May 26, 1989, a very clear statement of proper standard of
11

review of an administrative decision is set forth. Three standards
of review are commonly employed in appellate review of agency
decisions/ Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service
Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).

According to Judge Orme's

decision in Taylor, these standards operate on a continuum ranging
from questions of pure fact on which the appellate court defers to
the

agency's

findings

if

they

are

supported

by

substantial

evidence, to questions of general law to which the "correction of
error" standard is applied.

Id. at 608.

In instances where an agency's decision intertwines legal
interpretation of key provisions of the relevant statutes and the
basic facts of the case, the court applies a sliding scale. Where
questions of law predominate the court gives less deference to the
agency determination.

"Even with respect

to the

[agency's]

construction of its organic statute, we do not defer unless the
[agency] by virtue of expertise and experience . . . is in a
superior position to give effect to the regulatory objective." Big
K Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d 1349, 1353
(Utah 1984).

Where issues of law and fact are mixed, the court

should apply a reasonableness standard.

Taylor at 37.

On the

other hand, the "correction of error" standard should apply to
agency decisions involving statutory interpretations.
Board of Reviews, 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988).
12

Hurley v.

Certain issues raised by Mr. Tolman in this appeal will
require this court to apply the "correction of error" standard as
described above.

Accordingly, little or no deference should be

given the determination of the CSC or the district court with
respect to questions of law.
Consequently, the CSC should be reversed on those points
where this court's view of the applicable issues of law deviates
from that of the CSC.

To the extent that the CSC has erroneously

interpreted the law, they have abused their discretion and must be
reversed.
In reviewing the district court's decision affirming the
decision of the CSC, this court should utilize the same "correction
of error" standard the district court should have used in reviewing
the CSC's decision. The issues raised in this appeal are questions
of law.
law.

Tolman claims the CSC did not afford him due process of

The question of due process is a legal one.

Tolman also

claims the CSC committed reversible error by failing to rule on his
motions concerning "nexus." Nexus is a purely legal theory. Hence
the question is a legal one.

Tolman also claims he was submitted

to double jeopardy by the CAO.

His termination was expressly

based, at least in part, on action for which had already been
disciplined.

The principle of double jeopardy is again legal.

Once again the question is a legal one requiring the correction of
error standard.

The Utah Supreme Court held in Oates v. Chavez,
13

749 P.2d 658 (Utah 1988), that a trial court's conclusions of law
are "accorded no particular deference".

Id. at 659.

See also

Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985).
The

issues

are

questions

of

law which

require

no

deference, simply the correction of error standard. However, even
if the strictest standard of review — that for questions of fact - were required for this appeal, the district court's decision
should be reversed.

The standard of review for questions of fact

is an arbitrary and capricious standard. The United States Supreme
Court has held that such a standard is met if the decision was made
with consideration of factors not intended to be considered or if
there is a failure to consider an important aspect of the problem.
Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Association v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

The CSC and the

trial court failed to consider important facts relating to Tolman's
nexus, due process, and double jeopardy.

The manifest lack of

consideration of these factors as well as the consideration of
facts relating to previous and unrelated incidents involving Tolman
equates to an arbitrary and capricious disposition of this case.
POINT II: MR. TOLMAN IS ENTITLED TO MINIMUM DUE PROCESS
DUE TO HIS PROPERTY INTEREST IN CONTINUED
EMPLOYMENT WITH SALT LAKE COUNTY
Salt Lake County Policies and Procedures provide that the
presiding officials shall conduct fair and impartial hearings.
Policy No. 5715.

In order to have any protection at all, a merit
14

covered employee must be afforded procedural due process. In order
for procedure! due process to have meaning, it must include as a
minimum fair notice and fair hearing.

Implicit in both the Salt

Lake County Policy and the general law of procedural due process
as set forth in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 105
S.Ct. 1487 (1985), is the requirement that a final decision by the
CSC may not be affirmed on appeal if it is shown that an error by
the presiding official substantially affected the parties' rights.
This court had opportunity to address this issue recently
in D.B. v. Division of Occupational Professional Licensing. 779
P.2d 1145 (Utah 1989). That case was factually very similar to the
instant case. The plaintiff in D.B. was denied the opportunity to
cross examine a chief witness against him. The relevant testimony
was sworn to but simply read into the record.

This court held in

that case that the plaintiff had been denied his due process
rights.

Quoting State Department of Community Affairs v. Utah

Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah 1980), this court
held that "the more liberal the practice in admitting testimony,
the more imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules
of evidence".

This court further held that all parties must be

apprised of all the evidence submitted or considered.

This court

further held that all parties must also be given the right not only
to cross examine witnesses but to inspect all documents and offer
evidence to explain or rebut.

Id. at 1146.
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A quick comparison of the facts in D.B. to the case at
bar illustrates that Tolman was denied his due process rights. As
per the statement of facts above, the statement of David Nielsen
was read into the record by a CAO investigator.

The statement was

not even sworn as was the statement of the witness in D.B..
Furthermore, as per the statement of facts above, Tolman was also
denied access to records and documents used by the CAO.

Clearly,

the facts in this case are much more egregious than those in D.B. .
Tolman was denied his due process rights. Therefore, the decision
of the CSC and the district court should be reversed and Tolman
reinstated to his former position.
This rule is also discussed in Raaland v. Internal
Revenue Service, 6 M.S.P.B. 565 (1981).

Mere deviation from the

best procedure does not constitute reversible error.

In Raaland,

the presiding official conversed with the agency representative but
not with appellant's representative concerning the continuation of
a

hearing.

communication.

This

was

inappropriate

but

not

a

prejudicial

When error is more substantial, such as when the

agency submits material evidence to a presiding official that is
not provided to the appellant, Rucker v. Department of Treasury,
6 M.S.P.B. 80 (1981), the case should be remanded on appeal for the
appellant to respond to the evidence.
Traditionally, with regard to adjudicative errors by
presiding officials, the court looks to deprivation of substantive
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rights. The court in review of administrative errors of this sort
should look for guidance to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 61, which states that "The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard an error or defect in the proceedings which
does not effect the substantial rights of the parties." A similar
provision is found in Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, when the deviation becomes so substantial as to effect the
substantial rights of the parties, the court is justified in modifying the outcome based upon a deprivation of due process.
For example, in Lockner v. Department of Transportation,
DC 07528110695 (1983), the Federal Merit Systems Protection Board
("M.S.P.B.") reversed and remanded a grievance case after finding
that the presiding official made a substantial number of erroneous
evidentiary rulings concerning the examination of witnesses in
introduction and exclusion of evidence. The hearing was considered
unfair because the presiding official repeatedly allowed the agency
representative to ask leading questions, allowed critical agency
witnesses to testify from previously prepared statements without
any indication that they could not recollect events, and, in
addition, chastised appellant's counsel for raising objections that
were properly made.

In that case, as in the one presently before

the court, the M.S.P.B. said that although it would not strictly
apply the Federal Rules of Evidence in actions before it, the
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evidentiary errors by the presiding official severely curtailed the
appellant's substantive right to a fair and impartial hearing.
Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719 (Ct. CI. 1969)
contains

an

extensive

treatment

of

when

an

administrative

tribunal's failure to adequately control the admission of evidence
under a system where the technical rules of evidence are not
followed constitutes arbitrary and capricious acts of the tribunal.
In that case, an Air Force employee was discharged for accepting
bribes. The evidence establishing the taking of the bribes was in
the form of sworn "Affidavits" which were admitted through the
testimony of the person to whom the statements were made and who
administered the oath.

The employee challenged his dismissal on

the basis that the tribunal had committed error in admitting this
evidence.

He lost his appeal on this point but the court's

discussion illustrates what elements are essential through the
admissability of what is clearly harmful hearsay evidence.
The characteristics of evidence which made it proper for
the tribunal to accept it were: (1) it was probably an admission
against the penal interests of the declarant, thus satisfying one
of the tests of reliability hearsay; (2) it was testimony sworn
under oath, even though it did not meet all the requirements of a
formal affidavit; (3) it was offered into evidence in connection
with the testimony of the person who administered the oath; (4) it
was the best source of the information since the declarants were
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not susceptible to the subpoena power of the tribunal; (5) the
tribunal did not have subpoena power; and (6) the plaintiff had not
made an affirmative attempt

to secure the attendance of the

declarants.
In the present case, none of these elements is satisfied
in the incident where witness Sam Dawson of the CAO was allowed to
testify on behalf of David Nielsen based upon the transcript of an
interview.
David

The necessary conclusion is that the "testimony" of

Nielsen

spoken

into the record

by

Sam

Dawson was so

unreliable, and the procedure used to get it into the record over
objection of Mr. Tolman's counsel was so arbitrary, that it cannot
be allowed.

Moreover, even if there is no prejudice in terms of

whether Mr. Nielsen's "testimony" is substantial evidence, this
episode illustrates just how chaotic the hearing process was, and
how eager the Career Service Council was to hear improper evidence
that was highly prejudicial to Mr. Tolman.

Again, applying the

D.B. rationale, the decision of the CSC and the district court must
be reversed.
The record reflects the gymnastics to which the CAO went
to allow one of the managers who wanted to fire Tolman to "testify"
for Nielsen.

Nielsen was not "unavailable" as that term is used

in the Rules of Evidence.
Nielsen's "testimony" was not against his interest.

He

was, at most, an interested party in the sense that he stood to be
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embarrassed by the testimony of Mr. Tolman. In fact, he had a bias
due to the fact that he was vying against Mr. Tolman for the
affection and attention of Margo Bergvall.
Mr. Nielsen's testimony was not sworn.

It was given

under suspicious circumstances. No investigation was ever done in
relation to this incident until nearly two months after the fact.
Nothing was done until the issue of a possible termination for a
DUI arrest came up.

It was given in response to the solicitation

of the county attorney's office, not as a result of a voluntary
complaint by Mrs. Bergvall.
The testimony was entered by Sam Dawson. Dawson was not
even the person who conducted the interview.

Dawson did not

administer any oath. Nielsen never stated he was testifying as if
under oath in court.

Not even the most minimal effort was made to

assure the veracity of what was testified to.

Furthermore, there

are significant discrepancies between the sworn testimony of Mr.
Tolman and the statements of Nielsen.
Nielsen would have been the best source of testimony;
however, he was susceptible to subpoena and was, in fact, served
subpoenas by both sides.

By its enabling statute and rules, the

Career Service Council has subpoena power.

Mr. Tolman served

Nielsen with a valid subpoena issued by the Career Service Council.
Nielsen refused to obey it. On the record, counsel for Mr. Tolman
asked the CSC to cooperate in seeking a warrant through Third
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District Court for the arrest and production in the hearing of Mr.
Nielsen to give testimony.

The CSC refused.

Mr. Tolman did

everything possible to attempt to remedy the dilemma.

Counsel for

Mr. Tolman told the CSC that if it were a court of law, he would
instruct his client to walk out of the proceedings, suffer a
default to be taken against him and challenge the impropriety of
the CSC's actions on appeal, rather than risk the prejudice of such
unsworn, unreliable evidence.

In short, Mr. Tolman is in no way

responsible for the "unavailability" of Nielsen. Mr. Tolman fully
discharged his burden to obtain Nielsen's presence at the hearing.
Nielsen's statements were inflammatory

and extremely

prejudicial to Mr. Tolman's right to a fair hearing.

Mr. Tolman

maintains that the entire episode with Margo Bergvall, David
Nielsen, and the hot tub was improper for consideration by the CSC.
It was all off-duty conduct whose relevance was not established
through proper evidence and nexus as discussed below.

Thus, the

harm to Mr. Tolman was substantial and beyond his ability to
overcome at the hearing.
No evidence of the hot tub incident should have been
allowed.

Nexus is a legal issue clearly within the purview of the

CSC to decide.

Timely motions were made to exclude such evidence

Mr. Tolman's counsel even provided the CSC with a memorandum of law
to explain the concept. The CSC acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in failing to rule on the motion and further compounded the error
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by allowing the statements of Nielsen into the record through
hearsay.
According to Utah law, Peatross v. Board of Commissioners
of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976), if an administrative
tribunal acts in excess of its authority or in a manner so clearly
outside reason that its action must be deemed capricious and
arbitrary, the reviewing court may review the entire matter,
including matters of tribunal discretion.

The Nielsen incident

also constituted reversible error on the part of the CSC because
Mr. Tolman was deprived of his fundamental right to a fair hearing
due to his inability to challenge the veracity of Nielsen's
statements through cross examination.

The effect of the loss of

the right to cross examine was substantial in that Mr. Nielsen was
a key witness whose testimony bore directly on the credibility of
Margo Bergvall, the primary complaining witness against Mr. Tolman.
Had the CSC been given an opportunity through cross examination to
believe that Ms. Bergvall was less than candid in her testimony,
then it might have found no reason to charge Mr. Tolman with offduty violation adequate to sustain a termination.
Furthermore, counsel for Mr. Tolman made a motion at the
preliminary hearing held on November 3, 1986 to compel discovery
of any exculpatory material that may have been contained in the
tape transcripts of interviews with Margo Bergvall and David
Nielsen.

The CSC failed to act upon this motion.
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Had it

appropriately acted, there may have been some clarity as to what
was going to happen with Mr. Nielsen alleviating the need to enter
his testimony by way of hearsay transcripts.

Mr. Tolman should,

as a minimum, have been given a copy of the transcript of this
interview at the earliest juncture, but was not.

Mr. Tolman did

not have access to the Nielsen interview transcript until he was
confronted with its reading at the hearing when Mr. Dawson read the
transcript into the record.
In the preliminary hearing, Mr. Campbell stated for the
record that the CAO had obtained a transcript of the tape recording
of Margo Bergvall, but that he was not aware of any other
transcript or tape recording pertaining to the termination of Mr.
Tolman. At this juncture, Mr. Campbell should have revealed to Mr.
Tolman and his counsel that a transcript of the Nielsen interview
had been made and should have made it available to Mr. Tolman.
Counsel for Mr. Tolman responded to Mr. Campbell and to
the CSC in the form of a motion that any information that had not
been turned over in discovery for whatever purpose not be admitted
at the hearing.
Mr. Campbell indicated that notes were taken of the Margo
Bergvall interview and possibly the David Nielsen interview, but
also claimed that those were attorney work product and refused to
turn them over. Counsel for Mr. Tolman pointed out to the CSC that
since time did not allow formal discovery by way of deposition, Mr.
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Tolman was very much more reliant upon full and appropriate
disclosure by the CAO than he would normally have been.
Sherry Guyon, a member of the CSC, made a list of motions
made by counsel for Mr. Tolman at the preliminary hearing. Despite
all of the efforts of counsel for Mr. Tolman to assure that there
was complete discovery of all materials to be used at the hearing,
despite diligent effort to produce Mr. Nielsen as a witness at the
hearing, despite vigorous objection of the use of Mr. Nielsen's
hearsay testimony, and despite the clearly prejudicial nature of
the Nielsen testimony in the form that it was presented, the CSC
allowed the Nielsen statements to be entered into the record and
ultimately base the decision to sustain the termination, at least
in part, upon information to which the Nielsen testimony related.
This alone constituted a serious deprivation of Mr. Tolman's due
process rights to fair hearing.

As a matter of law the court

should reverse the CSC decision on this basis alone.
Further elements of substantial procedural errors form
a basis for reversal of the CSC decision.

According to Cash v.

Industrial Commission. 556 P.2d 827, 27 Ariz. App. 526 (1976),
although administrative

agencies may be relieved

from strict

observance of common law rules of evidence, their hearings must,
nonetheless, be conducted consistent with fundamental principles
which inhere in due process of law.

The CSC steadfastly refused

to rule upon prehearing dispositive motions claiming that it needed
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to hear "all of the evidence" and then sort out what was relevant
to the case.

The failure of the CSC to rule on these dispositive

motions constituted again a serious violation of a substantial
right of Mr. Tolman.

As a minimum Mr. Tolman had a right to have

dispositive motions ruled upon rather than held in abeyance.

Not

a single dispositive motion was ruled upon by the Career Service
Council prior to hearing, nor during the course of the hearing, nor
at the conclusion of the hearing.
Exhibit "C", Statement of Issues by Grievant submitted
prior to the prehearing conference in the Tolman matter illustrates
several of the dispositive matters that were ignored by the CSC.
For example, the issue of the exclusionary rule was raised on Page
4 of Exhibit "C".

At the commencement of the hearing, the CAO

appeared with an armed deputy sheriff whose purpose was to sit in
the hearing room throughout the proceedings ostensibly to protect
the witnesses from any harm at the hands of Mr. Tolman.

Counsel

for Mr. Tolman vociferously objected to presence of an armed guard
to no avail.2

The CSC allowed the guard to be present in the

hearing chambers throughout the entire hearing despite its obvious
prejudicial effect and despite the fact that nothing occurred to
give the slightest justification for the presence of anyone in
violation of the exlusionary rule let alone an armed guard.
2

The entire episode of the armed guard occurred off the

record.
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Failure of the CSC to exclude the armed guard was prejudicial and
should be grounds for reversal.
Exhibit "C" also refers to the issue of condonation and
performance appraisals at Page 6.

At the prehearing conference,

counsel for Mr. Tolman made a motion to eliminate from the hearing
any documentary evidence not contained in Mr. Tolman's personnel
file.

This motion was made in conjunction with the previously

mentioned motion for complete discovery of all material to be
presented by the terminating agency at the hearing.

The incident

involved in the testimony of David Nielsen is but one example of
the use of documentary evidence not contained in Mr. Tolman's
personnel file which was prejudicially allowed into the record.
The error of the CSC was in failing to rule upon the prehearing
motion to exclude such evidence, failing at the hearing to exclude
such evidence upon specific objection by counsel for Mr. Tolman,
and failure to rectify its error at the conclusion of the hearing
by excluding any such prejudicial information from forming the
basis of the ultimate decision.
CSC violated Mr. Tolman's due process rights by failing
to rule both prehearing, during the hearing, and post hearing on
the issue of nexus. A more complete discussion of the concept of
nexus is provided below. At the prehearing conference on November
3, 1986, counsel for Mr. Tolman presented the CSC with oral and
written argument on the issue of nexus, asking the CSC to rule that
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any evidence of off-duty conduct be excluded due to failure of the
CAO to meet its burden of proof that there was sufficient nexus
between off-duty conduct and the efficiency of the CAO in carrying
out its legal responsibilities.
Finally, at various junctures throughout the hearing,
counsel for Mr. Tolman raised objections to the admission of
certain evidence based upon the fact that there had been no ruling
on the prehearing motions pertaining to such evidence and upon the
fact that such evidence was either prejudicial or hearsay or
irrelevant based upon the concept of nexus.

The CSC chastised

counsel for Mr. Tolman with the admonition that its proper function
was to hear "all of the facts" and sort out those which are relevant. Repeated statements were made to the effect that the CSC was
not bound by the technical rules of procedure or evidence. Repeatedly# counsel for Mr. Tolman reminded the CSC that despite the
authority of the CSC to conduct hearings without strict reliance
on technical rules of evidence or procedure, fundamental rights of
Mr. Tolman were being affected by the conduct of the hearing.
POINT III: THE CAREER SERVICE COUNSEL COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY FAILING TO RULE ON APPELLANT'S
MOTIONS REGARDING "NEXUS"
On November 3, 1986, several days before the commencement
of the hearing in this matter, Mr. Tolman made several motions at
a pretrial hearing among which was the legal issue of "nexus" and
the impact it would have on the proper scope of the termination
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hearing.

The motion was taken under advisement by the CSC; no

ruling was issued prior to the opening of the hearing. Counsel for
Mr. Tolman asked the CSC for its ruling on the nexus issue
immediately before the first witness was called by the CAO.
CSC's decision was a "non-decision."

The

Essentially it ruled that is

function was to gather facts in an informal setting free from the
technical restraints of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Thus,
Mr. Tolman's nexus motion was denied over his protest.

This

allowed irrelevant matter into the hearing which was prejudicial
to the outcome.
Prior to the prehearing conference referred to abovef
counsel for Mr. Tolman submitted a statement of issues by grievant,
Exhibit "C" which contained a brief discussion of the concept of
nexus in the form of a motion to restrict the scope of the hearing.
During the course of the hearing between November 5 and November
19, 1986, counsel for Mr. Tolman submitted, by way of trial brief,
legal authority on the issue of nexus in support of various motions
and objections made regarding the admission of evidence of offduty conduct, Exhibit "C".

At the conclusion of the hearing,

counsel for Mr. Tolman submitted a memorandum of law on or about
November 19, 1986 dealing in great detail with the issue of nexus
and other dispositive issues.

Despite repeated reference to the

legal issue of nexus before, during and after the termination
hearing, the CSC based its final decision a large part upon
28

information that should have been excluded from the hearing had a
proper ruling on the nexus motions been made.

See, for example,

Finding of Fact 3, 4, 5, 6, and Conclusions of Law.
It is well settled that in adjudication of an employee's
appeal from an adverse action such as termination requires at least
two determinations

by the trier of

fact:

First, whether the

alleged conduct has, in fact, taken place; second, whether the
action taken by the agency, in this case termination, promotes the
efficiency

of the

service.

See, Danesev v.

Internal

Revenue

Service, DA 07528090242 (1982); A Guide to Merit Systems Protection
Board Law and Practice, by Peter B. Broida, Section Edition, 1985,
Dewey Publications, Inc., Washington, D.C., Page 282 (hereinafter
referred to as

"Broida").

The first requirement

is a factual

determination subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence;
the second element of the formulation is referred to as nexus.
A determination of nexus is necessary in all termination
cases, not only those involving off-duty conduct.

See, Risner v.

Federal Aviation Administration, 7 M.S.P.B. 342 (1981); Parsons v.
Department of Air Force, 707 F.2d 1406 (DC Cir. 1983).

In Parsons,

the employee was fired for being AWOL and submitting a false sick
leave request.

The court held that in an agency removal action

based upon misconduct, the agency must make three determinations:
(1) that the employee actually committed the alleged misconduct;
(2) that there is a sufficient nexus between the misconduct and the
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efficiency of the service to sustain the adverse action; and (3)
that the penalty imposed has been appropriately chosen for the
specific misconduct

involved.

The agency has the burden of

persuasion regarding these three elements of its decision and is
therefor obligated to present evidence to the Board necessary to
support each element.
Although the above citations relate to cases before the
Federal Merit Systems Protection Board, it is clear that the same
standard must apply in matters before the CSC. Policy No. 5715 of
the Salt Lake County Policies and Procedures establishes the same
nexus requirement is required under the Federal Merit Systems
Protection Board.

Policy No. 5715(1.0) states that "Dismissals,

demotions, reduction in pay or suspension shall only be to advance
the good of the public service," which is the equivalent to the
"efficiency of the agency language" underlying the nexus rule on
the federal level.

In other words, if an act has no effect on the

agency or in any way detracts from the good of the public interest,
it cannot support a termination.
In Norton v. Macey, 417 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
the D.C. Circuit held that immoral or indecent activity by an
employee can only be considered to support a dismissal only if the
activity has some ascertainable effect on the efficiency of the
service.

The court further stated that a reviewing court must at

least be able to discern some specific connection between the
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employee's potentially embarrassing activity and the efficiency of
the service.
Another court discounted the idea that "trust" alone
should be a sufficient basis to dismiss an employee for off-duty
conduct related to on-duty responsibilities. In Gloster v. General
Services Administration, 720 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court
held:
The position of trust theory seems to posit that
past offenses may render one unworthy of government
service regardless of the effect, or lack of effect, on
the functioning of the agency. This theory is, however,
contrary to the theory of the Civil Service Reform Act
that disciplinary actions may be taken only in the
service of efficiency. A federal government and society
in general certainly do not condone welfare fraud, but
punishment for such offenses is entrusted by the Act to
the criminal process so long as the offense has no work
related effects.
We are faced with a similar situation in this case. Mr.
Tolman's conduct related to a matter totally distinct from his work
responsibilities.

In regard to the Margo Bergvall, Mr. Tolman

engaged in a private act which was nothing more or less than a
domestic dispute.

The fact that Mr. Tolman is a sworn peace

officer is incidental to the events that occurred on June 10 and
11, 1986. That incident was a fight between former lovers and not
between a peace officer and a member of the public.
The CAO is not entitled to any presumption here that
would ordinarily arise from very serious off-duty misconduct.
Consequently, the CAO must bear the burden of proving by the proper
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standard that the efficiency of the service is going to be
impaired.

Broida at 284.
The leading nexus case is Merritt v. Department of

Justice, 6 M.S.P.B. 493 (1981), involving a bureau of prison's
correctional officer removed from his position for using and
sharing with friends at home a small quantity of marijuana.

The

board held:
A nexus determination must be based on evidence
linking the employee's off-duty misconduct with the
efficiency of the service, or in certain circumstances,
on a presumption of nexus which may arise from the nature
and gravity of the misconduct. In the latter situation,
the presumption may be overcome by evidence of showing
an absence of adverse effect on service efficiency, in
which case the agency may no longer rely solely on the
presumption, but must present evidence to carry its
burden of proving nexus. The quantity and quality of the
evidence which the agency need present in that
circumstance would clearly then depend on the nature and
gravity of the particular misconduct as well as upon the
strength of the showing made by the appellant in
overcoming the otherwise applicable presumption.
The board in Merritt went on to hold that in most cases
of even clearly criminal conduct, the establishment of nexus need
not and should not depend upon a mere assertion or speculation.
Nexus may not be presumed on the basis of a criminal conviction
alone without consideration of the character and seriousness of
the offense.

The board observed that in only two judicial cases

had a presumption of nexus been made:

(1) a criminal conviction

of killing an individual without necessity, and (2) a particularly
repellant act of child molestation without a criminal conviction.
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In Merritt, the board found no nexus established relative
to the appellant, since there was no logical basis upon which to
believe that for using a small amount of marijuana at his home, the
appellant would be more likely to break the employer's rules
against introduction of contraband into the prison compound.

His

performance was excellent on the job; there was no evidence
suggesting that the appellant might be a victim of possible
pressures and blackmail as a result of his activities.

The fact

that the appellant's conduct may have been unlawful did not relieve
the agency of

its burden to establish

the requisite nexus,

particularly in view of limitations on the power of the government
to intrude unnecessarily upon the discreet conduct of citizens,
including federal employees, in the privacy of their homes.
The present case closely parallels the rationale of the
Merritt case and provides an excellent example of a case in which
there is no nexus between the off-duty conduct and the efficiency
of the service.
contained

The notice of termination received by Mr. Tolman

broadly

sweeping

inimical to public service.

allegation

that

his

behavior was

There was no connection between a

possible lapse of judgment in a moment of emotional weakness in an
intimate private setting, such as occurred in the Tolman case, and
the necessary exercise of caution and judgment in his position as
an investigator for CAO. There is no connection between any of the
misconduct alleged by the agency and Mr. Tolman's ability to
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faithfully and fully perform the responsibilities of his position.
There is no rational connection between his alleged outburst at
Margo Bergvall and the likelihood that he would fail to assiduously
carry out the responsibilities of an investigator in the County
Attorney's office.
performance record.

Furthermore, Mr. Tolman presents an exemplary
As in Merritt, there is no evidence in this

case suggesting that Mr. Tolman would be the victim of possible
pressure and blackmail as a result of his activities.

In short,

the CAO may not make a bald assertion of acts inimical to public
service and use that to support the termination of a long term,
faithful, valuable servant of Salt Lake County.
There can be no question that there is no basis to employ
presumption of nexus in this case. There was no conviction of any
crime, nor was there any charge brought for criminal violation
relevant to the allegations supporting termination.

The acts

alleged here occurred during off-duty hours and did not involve the
use of any employer property or instrumentality; thus, there can
be no argument that there is a reasonable fear of a recurrence of
the alleged acts and any effect that this may have on the agency's
mission to carry out its public responsibilities and dealings with
the public.
Furthermore, the discipline that was imposed is the
harshest form of discipline available in an administrative setting.
It is the administrative counter part of a death sentence in the
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criminal context.

The agency must have an increasingly greater

burden of proof and persuasion when the penalty assessed is of this
magnitude.
The CAO attempted to show that it had been tarnished in
the public eye by Tolman's actions.

However the record shows how

low the CAO's public image was prior to any acts by Tolman.

The

numerous scandals mentioned above make it nearly impossible for
the CAO to claim harm to its image.
A perusal of the cases dealing with law enforcement
officers and alleged off-duty misconduct fails to reveal a single
case in which a penalty as substantial as termination has been
sustained on a showing of nexus between peace officer duties and
an infraction as minor as that alleged in this case.

See Broida,

at Pages 303 and 304. In this case, there is no logical connection
between the fact that Mr. Tolman is a sworn peace officer and
alleged misconduct.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision
from the CSC contain no specific finding of fact relating to the
issue of nexus. There is no mention of an impairment of the agency
mission of the County Attorney's office attributable to any conduct
by Mr. Tolman.

The only reference to a connection between off-

duty conduct and Mr. Tolman's official responsibilities was that
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in Finding of the Fact No. 6 dealing with poor judgment.3 The lack
of a specific finding of fact and related conclusion of law is
independent legal justification for a reversal of the CSC decision
in this matter.

Of late, the Utah Supreme Court has been very

insistent that final orders be based upon adequate findings of fact
and conclusions of law.

The findings and conclusions in the

hearing below are so sketchy as to be worthless on review.

This

alone justifies reversal or remand.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing
discussion is that there is no reasonable nexus between the alleged
events and the agency efficiency in this case. Any connection that
the agency tries to draw is merely coincidental and has nothing to
do with the substance of the alleged events.

Consequently, the

agency cannot support its burden of proof in this matter and any
imposition of penalty by the agency and sustaining of that penalty
by the CSC is reversible error.
In the Muskegon Heights Police Department cited at 88 LA
675 (BNA), facts very similar to those in this case lead to a
3

Finding of Fact No. 8 contains an oblique, hypothetical
reference to discredit and disfavor arising from the incident
between Mr. Tolman and John Harrington, the reporter. A review of
the record indicates clearly, however, that Mr. Harrington
testified on behalf of Mr. Tolman in the termination proceeding
and indicated that Harrington was as much to blame for any
disagreement as Mr. Tolman was. Furthermore, there is no evidence
in the record to support a conclusion that the Tolman/Harrington
incident brought any discredit or disfavor on the CAO.
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determination of no nexus and reinstatement.

In that case, a

police officer was terminated for conduct unbecoming a police
officer for reasons of off duty misconduct.

The officer had an

on-going romantic involvement with a woman whom he caught making
love to another man.

The police officer forced his way into the

home, beat the woman, abducted her from her home, and forced her
to have sex with him.
acquitted.

He was charged criminally and ultimately

The terminating agency alleged that the status of the

grievant as a peace officer constituted sufficient nexus to sustain
termination for off-duty behavior.
The hearing officer determined that to justify termination of the grievant's employment the agency must establish a nexus
between the off-duty conduct and his on-the-job responsibilities.
The hearing officer ruled that the grievant did not use his status
as a police officer in any manner.

Even though the grievant did

have his service revolver during the altercation, he did not use
it to force the lover to leave the ex-wife's premises.

The mis-

treatment was in no way associated with the grievant's status as
a police officer.

His actions were entirely personal.

There was

no indication that the grievant was prone to this type of behavior
while performing his law enforcement duties.

The hearing officer

found the grievant status as a police officer not establish in
nexus between the investigation of the altercation and the subsequent prosecution on criminal charges. Moreover, the fact that the
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grievant was found "not guilty" vindicated the grievant, vis-avis the off-duty conduct.

"Otherwise a police officer's employment

will be severely jeopardized based on an allegation of wrong doing.
. . . This record does not support an inference that the grievant is
unable to function as a police officer."

Id. at 679. The ultimate

ruling, based upon facts very similar to the Tolman case, was that
despite the existence of a peace officer status and despite the
allegations of off-duty misconduct and the possibility of adverse
publicity to the terminating agency, there was no establishment of
nexus sufficient to support a termination of employment. That case
was essentially a private dispute which became "public" by virtue
of police and prosecutorial intervention.

The same elements per-

tain to the Tolman case and support a reversal of the CSC decision.
POINT IV: THE CSC FAILED TO CONSIDER MITIGATION OF PENALTIES
If the court decides that there has been an adequate
showing of justification for the imposition of a penalty in this
case, it is reasonable for the court to conclude that the penalty
of termination should be mitigated downward substantially.

The

burden on the CAO to persuade the court of the propriety of the
penalty

imposed,

including

the

burden

of

establishing

by a

preponderance of the evidence any conclusions of fact upon which
the particular sanction rests. Malinconico v. U.S. Postal Service,
N.Y.O. 7528119213 (1983).

In the case of Douglas v. Veterans'

Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313 (1981), the following factors were
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enumerated by the Merit Systems Protection Board as relevant
considerations in a determination of discipline in a particular
case:
1.

The nature and seriousness of the offense, and its

relation to the employee's duties, position, and responsibilities,
including whether the offense was intentional or technical or
inadvertent or was committed maliciously or for gain, or was
frequently repeated;
2.

The employee's job level and type of employment,

including supervisory or fiduciary role, contacts with the public,
and prominence of the position;
3.

The employee's past disciplinary record;

4.

The employee's past work record, including length

of service, performance on the job, ability to get along with
fellow workers, and dependable;
5.

The effect

of the offense upon the employee's

ability to perform at a satisfactory level and its effect on
supervisor's

confidence

in the employee's

ability to perform

assigned duties;
6.

Consistency of the penalty with those imposed on

other employees for the same or similar offenses;
7.

Consistency of the penalty with the applicable

agency table of penalties;
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8.

The notoriety of the offense or its impact upon the

reputation of the agency;
9.

The clarity with which the employee was on notice

of any rules that were violated in committing the offense, or had
been warned about the conduct in question;

such

as

10•

Potential for employee's rehabilitation;

11.

Mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense

unusual

job

tensions,

personality

problems,

mental

impairment, harassment, or bad faith, malice or provocation on the
part of others involved in the matter; and
12.

The

adequacy

and

effectiveness

of

alternative

sanctions to deter such conduct in the future by the employee or
others.
In applying these factors to the facts of the case at
hand, it must first be born in mind that the CAO has gone to great
lengths in this case to create a case to support the termination
of Mr. Tolman.4

None of the individual

incidents, even if

completely true and even if directly related to Mr. Tolman's
ability to perform his work responsibilities, would be sufficient
to support a termination.
The only allegation against Mr. Tolman that has any
direct bearing upon his job responsibilities was the claim of
4

Prior to the hearing it was the opinion of counsel for the
CAO that the CAO could not win the case. See Exhibit "D".
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personal use of a company vehicle.

Under the policies and

procedures of the CAO, the investigators were entitled to use their
company vehicles for incidental personal use despite the overall
policy against unlimited personal use.

There was no showing in

this instance that Mr. Tolman's personal use of the company car was
in violation of the incidental use policy.

Furthermore, this was

a very minor allegation, even if it was proven to be true, which
has very little relation to Mr. Tolman's duties, position and
responsibilities. Furthermore, that allegation was the subject of
complete discussion and was resolved between the parties.

The

agency tried to raise it a second time which it cannot do as
discussed in the section on double jeopardy.
The rest of the allegations against Mr. Tolman fell into
the category of being alcohol related off-duty conduct, the John
Harrington incident and the Margo Bergvall incident.

the John

Harrington incident was adequately dealt with at the time and was
raised again for a second go around of penalty in violation of the
double jeopardy rule. The Margo Bergvall incident was an off-duty
domestic fight that had no bearing upon Mr. Tolman's ability to do
his job.

The alcohol related incidents all fell in the category

of alcoholism which has been recognized in Salt Lake County as a
handicap.

It was shown in the hearing that Salt Lake County had

an employee resource program which supervisors are trained to use.
In this case, the agency had simply chosen not to make a referral
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because it would interfere with their primary motive of terminating
Ralph Tolman rather than trying to seek his rehabilitation.

This

was a direct violation of Mr. Tolman's rights and cannot support
the termination.
Mr. Tolman was an investigator with no supervisory or
fiduciary responsibilities.

He did have contact with the public.

However, the position he had is not prominent outside the context
of the scandals that surrounded the CAO.
Mr. Tolman had been disciplined in the past.

However,

it had been done in a very haphazard manner and had not been done
in a way that would have put him on adequate notice that a DUI
arrest or an off-duty domestic dispute would cause his immediate
termination.
Tolman's

Furthermore, there had been no showing that Mr.

disciplinary

record

was

out

of

the

ordinary

for

investigators in the CAO.
Mr. Tolman's past work record was exemplary. He had been
employed since 1971 in the capacity of law enforcement.

He had

been singled out for commendation for his performance of his job.
There was repeated testimony that his ability to get along with his
fellow workers and dependability was first rate.

There had been

no criticism leveled at Mr. Tolman's ability to perform his job.
There was no testimony placed on the record relating to
the effect of the alleged offenses upon Mr. Tolman's ability to
perform at a satisfactory level other than that mentioned above and
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the effect of the alleged offenses upon his supervisor's confidence
in his ability to perform his duties.
directly on this point.

No one has testified

Those witnesses who would have been

confident to testify in this regard did not and even had they done
so, their testimony would have been self-serving because they are
the ones who put together the case against Mr. Tolman and put their
reputations on the line to support the termination effort.

The

only independent statements of Mr. Tolman's ability to perform his
job duties came from his co-workers who all testified, without
exception, that their ability to perform with him in the future
would not be impaired by the allegations that had been made against
him.
There was no extensive testimony that Mr. Tolman had been
singled out in regard to the penalty that the agency had chosen to
impose for these offenses.

Other members of the CAO staff have

been arrested for DUI offenses in the past and have not been
terminated.
agencies

In fact, other members of the CAO staff and other

in Salt

Lake City

and

Salt

Lake County

have been

repeatedly arrested for DUI and have not lost their employment as
a result. This is illustrative of a fact that should be recognized
by the CAO in this case:

An off-duty DUI arrest which did not

result

did

in a conviction,

employee's

ability

to

do

not

his

have

hob.
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any bearing
That

was

the

upon the
relevant

consideration and that issue was shown to be decisively in Mr.
Tolman's favor.
The offense of which Mr. Tolman was accused had received
some notoriety in the press.

It should be born in mind that the

notoriety arose from press releases made by the CAO or responses
made by the CAO representatives to press inquiries. The DUI arrest
alone would not have raised any concern in the media.

The reason

it received as broad dissemination as it did was because of the
other

scandals

emanating

innocently played a part.

from

the

CAO

in which

Mr.

Tolman

Independent of those other scandals,

this incident would never have received the attention that it did.
Mr. Tolman was not responsible in any way for the dissemination of
any information that would have been harmful to the CAO.
It was shown throughout the hearing that the CAO is very
lax

in

its creation

disciplinary actions.

and preservation

of written

records of

It was also shown that the CAO is very lax

in the dissemination of policies and procedures.

Mr. Tolman

learned of the proposed discipline for the personal use of county
vehicles for the first time in the context of his termination. He
also learned for the first time that the CAO intended to terminate
people for being arrested for DUI in the context of his termination
proceeding.
which

Tolman

regulations.

That illustrated there was very little clarity on
could

rely

to

give

him

notice

of

rules

and

Tolman had a constitutionally protected interest in
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his continued employment.

That could not be taken lightly and

could not be taken away on the flimsy case put together by the CAO.
Any

doubt

as to the

sufficiency

of

notice

and

fairness of

proceedings had to be decided in favor of the employee in light of
this constitutionally protected property interest.
Mr. Tolman deserved an attempt to rehabilitate himself
in relation to his alcoholism.

The county created an affirmative

obligation on the part of the CAO to make referrals to the County
Employee

Resource

Program

specifically

for

the

purpose

of

rehabilitation. That is a duty owed by the CAO to Mr. Tolman which
was breached in this case.

To make matters worse, the CAO had

tried to turn these alcohol related incidents into the basis for
termination without having first carried out its affirmative duty
to make the county's resources for rehabilitation available to Mr.
Tolman.
There

were

a

number

of

mitigating

circumstances

surrounding the alleged offenses which should have been taken into
consideration.

Perhaps the most inflammatory accusation made

against Mr. Tolman was the incident involving Margo Bergvall.

It

should have been noted that this incident occurred at a point of
breakup of a twelve year relationship during which Mr. Tolman lived
with Ms. Bergvall.

After twelve years of a relationship of this

nature, it should be understandable that there would be extreme
emotional distress if one were to find his or her lover in the arms
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of another person.

That have been taken into consideration when

judging Mr. Tolman's actions.

Until recently, many states in the

United States would have allowed a person to plead this type of
emotional distress as a defense for homicide.

If it constitutes

a defense for a capital crime, it should certainly have had some
bearing upon the consideration of mitigation in the context of a
termination hearing.
It was also relevant to consider Tolman's personality
and training.

The county, through the sheriff's office and the

CAO, made Tolman the type of person he was.

They paid him to

drink; they encouraged him to infiltrate criminal elements; they
supported him when he acted aggressively, and they commended him
for doing all of these things in a very stressful work environment.
The training and experience lead to Mr. Tolman's alcoholism.

To

a large extent, the county was responsible for the alleged behavior
they then used against Mr. Tolman.
Furthermore, there was no doubt that the CAO had been
embroiled in one scandal after another.

It was no secret that Mr.

Tolman had been singled out by his superiors because of the role
that he had played in at least one of those scandals. A review of
the press at that time indicates that Mr. Tolman had consistently
been forthcoming with information in the various investigations
surrounding those scandals.

There was live testimony in the

hearing indicating that Mr. Tolman's superiors resented him for
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being honest and for
honesty.

embarrassing the office because of his

If that was not enough to entirely exonerate Mr. Tolman

under the circumstances, it certainly should have been enough to
mitigate the penalty of termination substantially downward.

This

court should not allow the CAO to discard a man after it made him
into the type of man he was. Mr. Tolman only asks that he be given
fair treatment in consideration of the matter.
POINT V:

THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE MAY NOT IMPOSE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR EVENTS WHICH WERE THE
SUBJECT OF FORMER DISCIPLINE
Both the personal use of a county car issue and the

incident

with

John

Harrington

were

the

subjects

discipline and should not have been re-punished.

of

former

It was revealed

in the hearing, that Mr. Tolman received "discipline" for the
personal mileage issue.

Even though Mr. Tolman, Jim Burns and

Casey Romijn all recalled that the issue was settled in a meeting
attended by Mr. Tolman, Mr. Romijn and Don Harmon, the agency
maintained that it, in fact, imposed a probation on Mr. Tolman as
discipline for the event.
hearing

that

incident.

Mr.

It was further brought out in the

Tolman was

disciplined

for

the

Harrington

It consisted only of a "reprimand."
It has been consistently held that an agency may not

punish an employee twice for the same misconduct.

For example, in

Burton v. Civil Service Commission, 394 N.E.2d 1168 (111. 1979),
it was held that a civil service employee could not be suspended
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for ten days and then later discharged

for the same act of

accepting a gratuity from a taxpayer. The court concluded that the
initial ten-day suspension constituted the final disciplinary
action and that to then impose discipline for the same event was
double jeopardy.

The agency was estopped from enhancing the

severity of the original suspension.
The court in Messina v. City of Chicago, 495 N.E.2d 1228
(111. 1986), discussed the Burton case and provided an extensive
treatment of the issue of double jeopardy in administrative law and
labor arbitration.

The following excerpt is given to illustrate:

The so-called double jeopardy rule preventing
imposition by management of more than one penalty for a
single offense is not seriously questioned in any
arbitral authority. It is a salutory and necessary rule
going to the very heart of due process and fundamental
fairness. If a second penalty may be invoked for one
offense, why not a third and where and when will it stop?
The worker is entitled to know his case is determined and
settled and that further discipline will be applied only
if he errs anew. (Citing 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1313, 1314).
See also. Auburn Faith Community Hospital, Inc. v.
California Nurses Association, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 882, 893 (Killion
Arb.

1976)

("It

is

now

an

established

tenet

of

industrial

jurisprudence that one a penalty has been assessed and accepted,
it cannot be increased.

This principle is based on concepts of

double jeopardy borrowed from the criminal law and on those of due
process and fair play. Once management has assessed a penalty, it
does not get a second go at the employee for the same infraction,

48

when, upon review, higher management deems the first penalty
inadequate."); Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat
Cutters Local 600, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 796, 799 (Herman Arb. 1976);
Stauffer

Chemical

Co. v.

International

Union

of

Operating

Engineers, Local 912, 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 414, 416 (Davis Arb. 1975)
("This principle [against double jeopardy] is so well-known and so
well-established as not to require specific explanation."); Ashland
Oil & Refining Co. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union, Local 11-420, 28 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 874, 878 (Bradley Arb.
1957) ("Disciplinary action to be effective should be prompt and
positive."); Michigan Seamless Tube Co. v. United Steelworkers of
America, Local 1900, 24 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 132, 134 (Ryder Arb. 1955);
Durham Hosiery Mills v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers,
Branch 31-A, 24 Lab. Arb. 356, 358 (Livengood Arb. 1955); John
Deere Tractor Co. v. United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, Local 838, 12 Lab. Arb. 129, 131
(Updegraff Arb. 1949) ("Much has been written concerning [double
jeopardy as] a concession to the widespread basic feeling that
after one punishment has been imposed or even after there has been
one opportunity for punishment, further punishment or efforts to
impose penalties are oppressive, unfair, and unjust.")
There is a constant theme running through these cases:
Management had an opportunity to assess timely and appropriate
discipline (and in some instances did) but attempted to resurrect
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old misconduct as a ground for new discipline.

This has been

consistently rejected by the courts and labor arbitrators.
same theme is present in this case.

The

The CAO has gone back more

than five years to dredge up every bit of dirt it could against
Ralph Tolman.

It asks the court to go against the wisdom of

decades of precedent to uphold termination on the sheer weight of
all of these allegations, regardless of when they occurred and what
had been done at the time to impose discipline or to excuse the
conduct.
Tolman

asks

that

the

relevant

presentation of evidence be limited.

time

frame

for the

Tolman asserts that what

occurred in the past and was either made the subject of prior
disciplinary

actions

or

excused

and

condoned

through

above-

standard and standard performance evaluations was irrelevant to the
hearing.
Double jeopardy was not just some slick argument brought
up at the CSC hearing in an attempt to protect Mr. Tolman.

It was

a manifestation of substantive and procedural due process.

Mr.

Tolman

was

should

not

have

been

punished

for

conduct

that

disciplined, excused, or ignored in the past.
CONCLUSION
The hearing was so flawed due to failure to rule on
essential motions, improper rulings, admission of prejudicial
hearsay,

allowing

witnesses

to
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testify

on

behalf

of

other

witnesses,

failure

to

exclude

information

not

disclosed

in

discovery, and allowing an armed guard to be present in the
hearing, as to constitute a deprivation of Tolman's procedural due
process.
Irrelevant material which should not have been admitted
over objections based on the nexus rule significantly shaped the
course and outcome of the hearing.
Tolman was charged with stale charges and subjected to
double jeopardy.

He was the target of a political vendetta.

He

was the victim of crass manipulation of the County merit rules.
He was singled out for termination because of his forthright stand
on issues of corruption in the CAO.
Pursuant

to

Section

63-46b-16(4)(c), (d), (e), and

(h)(iii) of the Utah Code Annotated, this court should reverse the
judgment of the CSC and the district court.
requiring

resolution

interpreted

were

decided;

law has

Not all issues
been

erroneously

and applied; there has been a failure to follow

prescribed procedure, and the decision to terminate Tolman was
contrary to the CSC's prior practice without a fair and rational
basis.
For all these reasons, based upon questions of law,
Tolman should be reinstated to his former position with full
restitution of backpay and benefits.
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DATED this

<fa

day of July, 1990.
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.

L.' Zan/e Gill
Attorrley for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
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Confidential Memorandum from CAO's Counsel
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& ©fftrc of the jgait ^ a k c (Enuniu JViinrncu
T.L. "TED" CANNON
County Attorney

MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ
Ch»#< Oeouiy County Attorney

September 8, 1986

Ralph Tolman
Salt Lake County Attorney's
Office
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
SUBJECT:

Notice of intent to terminate.

Dear Ralph:
This letter is to inform you rhat pursuant to Sections
17-33-5(3)(p) 1733-7(2)(e) and
17-33-10. U.C.A.
(1953 as
amended), and Salt Lake County Policy 5715, I am terminating
your employment with the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
effective September 19, 1986. Your last working day at the
office will be September 19, 1986.
This decision-is based upon your continuing misconduct
and acts inimical to public service; i.e., your D.U.I. arrests
and other incidences which reflect poorly upon this office,
tarnishes the image thereof, and you have failed to obey
reasonable
orders
of your
supervisor.
Because
of your
inappropriate behavior, this office is left with no alternative
but to terminate your employment.
Additionally, your acts
reflect an emotional instability which not only present a
danger to the citizens of Salt Lake County but places your
status of a police officer in jeopardy.
The specific
follows:
are as

incidences

on which

this

office relies

1. On June 5, 1981, you were arrested by the Utah
Highway Patrol for driving under the influence of alcohol. You
subseguently pled guilty to a lesser included offense of
reckless driving. You were verbally warned and given five days
suspension by Don Sawaya, Chief Deputy of the Recovery
Division, with the admonishment that any further acts of this

231 East 4th South
amtntstrntion
•oge r A. Livingston
**uet Deoutv Countv Artornev
-*' 4oT>ir>tMrative Affairs

C County Attorney Victim Services
Julie Branch
Director
4tr\ Floor

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
C Justice Division
Waiter R Ellen
Chie! Deouty
3 r c Floor

(801) 363-7900

D Investigative Agency
Don Harman
Soeciai Agent in Charge
4th Floor"

O Civil Division
William R. Hyde
Chief Deputy
2nd Floor

C Government;
Donald Saw*
Chiet DeoutN
2nd Floor

Ralph Tolman
September 8, 1986
Page 2
nature would result in your termination.
of D.U.I, charges marked as Attachment 1).

(See attached memos

2. In 1984 you were apprehended by the Midvale Police
after you and your wife left the Sage Lounge. Sergeant Tim
Short of the Midvale Police Department determined that you were
too intoxicated to drive. Because of your position with this
office, you were not arrested but allowed the opportunity to
find another way home.
3. On August 18 of this year, you were arrested by a
Salt Lake City police officer for running a red light and
Driving under the Influence. Your breathalizer test showed a
.15 percent alcohol content.
(See attached copies of police
report
marked as Attachment 2).
Certainly three D.U.I,
offenses within six years demonstrates poor judgment by a
police officer who is Bworn to obey the law.
4. On June 10, 1986, you assaulted and battered Margo
Bergwall.
This office recognizes that relationships develop
between adults, but your .actions in regards to Ms. Bergwall
demonstrate ..an inability .to control your emotions.
Clearly
this office cannot tolerate your intimidations and threats made
to Ms. Bergwall and her acquaintances.
5.
In a nemo .of January 1986, you and the other
investigators were directed that County Attorney vehicles were
not to be used for personal use or on the weekends. Your
obvious disobedience of this directive has • been documented by
Don Harmon, who checked
your mileage on two different
occasions. Furthermore, you were observed on August 9, 1986 at
Ms.
Bergwall's
residence
in a County Attorney's Office
vehicle.
(See attached memos dated February 5, 1986 from Lt.
Sam Dawson, and memo dated February 4, 1986 marked as
Attachment 3).
6. Your confrontation with John Harrington on October
8, 1985 again demonstrates poor judgment by an investigator of
this office. (See attached memo marked as Attachment 4).
7. In September of 1982, you lied to your immediate
supervisor concerning the transportation of a witness. Clearly
this office must trust its employees to be truthful and this
applies even more to one who is a sworn peace officer. (See
attached memos marked as Attachment 5).
It is for the above stated reasons that it is this
office's decision to terminate your employment. You have the
right
to have
a pretermination
hearing
to present any
mitigating factor in your favor. Said hearing will be held 10
o'clock Friday, September 12, 1986.
In the event that your

Ralph Tolman
September
Q , 1986
Page 3
explanations
do
not
mitigate
the
above
charges, your
termination will be effective on the date first above written.
Please find attached a copy of Salt Lake County Policy
5705, entitled Grievance Procedure. -This action will be heard
at the department review level.
Sincerely.
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY

"T. L. "Ted" Cannon

(0923J)

•(<-V / L '

BEFORE THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL

I N RE:

AoDeal o f
RALPH

:

TOLMAN

Service

Council

Novemoer 19, 1966.
J. Homer,

and

UL

COIN

:

C a s e N O . 66—15

November

5.

Council

mernoers.

Snerri

S. Adams

Salt Lane Countv

1966 ana conduced on
R. Guyon, Wiliard

were present.

Appellant. Raloh

To1wan, was present and reoresented by his counsel
attorney for

Public Employee 1 s

tne Utah

Attorney.

representative,

AT\Q Jerry

L. Zane Gill,

Association.

Lake County Attorney's Office was reoresentea
Deoartment

'

ANE

on

Rooert

*<S

:

This matter came on for near1no Defore tne
Career

H

Fir

Dv Don

Camppell,

The Bait
Sawava. as

Deputy County

Testimony was given, facts were aaduced. exhibits were

receivea, and

otherwise being

fully aDorised in tne matter, the

Council nereoy enters its Fincinos of

Fact, Conclusions

of Law.

and Decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Tne Appellant.

cat or for tne Salt Lane

Ralon To1 man.
County

w*s hired as an Investi-

flttornev's

Orfice

on

April 1.

I960.
£.

Tnat the responsibilities ana outies of an InvestIcator

were tne same resoonsioi1itles
officer in

the State

anc outies

as a

law enforcement

of Utan and tnat tne position of Salt L.ake

County Investigator reauirea peace officer certification.

-23.

Tnat on

tne earlv morning nours of June 5, 19B1, RalDh

Tolman. wno was not on auty with tne Salt Lake

County Attorney's

Office, was arrestee bv tne Utan Highway Patrol for orivino unaer
the influence of alcohol. far. Tolman
Lake County
gloveoox.

Attorney's Office

had

been

vehicle and

Mr. Tolman was verDally

driving

a Salt

had a firearm in the

warned

and

oiven

five aavs

suspension DV tne Salt Lake County Attorney's Office after he nad
plead guilty to a lessor offense of reckless driving.
4.

In 19S3

Officers

of

Lounge.

One

mr. Tolman

or

tne

1984,

Ralon

Midvale

of

the

stagger

Tolman

Police

officers

towaros

a

was

oDservea

Department
testifiea

exiting
tnat

by two
the Sane

ne

oDvtrved

enter the vehicle, txriQ

vehicle.

start its engine, wnereuoon they Dlocked the vehicle from leaving
the

area.

The

other

officer testified that he saw Mr. Tolman

exit tne Lounge and that ne saw tne brake liants

of Mr. Tolman's

vehicle.
This Council oelieves tne Officer'-* version of tn» events at
the Sage Lounge when they
behind
This

tne

wneel

Council

Mr. Tolman was

of

further
in fact

maicated

the

RalDh

Tolman

was

in fact

venicle ana was attempting to leave.

believes

tne

Officer's

version

that

intoxicated from aiconol and tnat nao he

not Deen an Investlpator for Salt LaK.e County, ne would nave Deen
arrested by tne Officers of Midvale.
5.

On Aucust

IB, 1966, Mr. Tolman was arrested for crivinc

unaer tne influence of
11th

East.

His

blooa

aiconol at
alcohol

aooroxirnateiv l7tn
level

admit tea tnat he haa alead guilty to an

was

.152.

Soutn ana
Mr. Tolman

aiconol-reiated reckless
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ariving

offense.

Tnis

Council

notes tnat on ftuqust 16, 1966,

RalDh Toirnan was not on auty nor was he on

duty in

the incident

at the Sage Lounge in Midvale.
6.

In regards

to tne

alienations of

Council f m a s that Raloh Tolman did

June 10, 1966, tnis

assault and

batter a female

acquaintance and her male friend at her home w m l e Mr. Toirnan was
off auty.
Tolman

However, on the aay

was

on

auty,

he

battered her male friend.
on

his

way

Attorney's

to

work

vehicle

when

acauamtance* s house
norne.

Tne

on

Council

June
he

DUDIIC

home

and assaulted and
RalDh Tolman was

stopoed

his

in

car

at

6s0tf a. rn
reparas

ana that

oersonal use.

the

fernai©

and enterea the

to

this incident,

his actions constituted'

service. „

In January of 1966, RalDn Tolman and tne
were

while RalDh

11, 1966, in a Salt Lake County

tnat

acts mimical to

1966,

were that

at aooroxlmately
fines

11,

hmr

The facts

ooor judgment

igators

June

entered

Mr. Toirnan usee

7.

of

instructed

not

to

other Invest-

use their County vehicles for

The facts were that RalDh Toirnan

used his venicie

on three seoarate occasions for his own oersonal use ana this was
in violation of a direct oraer from a supervisor, a
msuDorcination.

Notning

was

ciear act of

presented by the Appellant wnicn

wouid mitigate his actions for disoaevmn a airect oraer.
8.
very poor

The Council

behavior wnen

local news reporter on
was the

further

fines

he launched
October 6,

that

Mr. Toirnan exhibitea

a verbal

1S£5.

attack anamst a

Clearly.

instigator of a very heatea argument.

that the location of the incident comoined with

Raloh Tolman

Tne Council finds
tne fact

that a

-4-

well—known

trial

was

strates not only a
acts

tnat

would

lack of
bring

Attorney*« Office.
as

a

law

Demnj

and

officer.

to the County

lack of professionalism

The

news reporter

but also constitutes

disfavor

The actions showed a

enforcement

duty and

pood judpment,

discreait

incident with the local
was on

neld in tne close Droxirnity demon-

Council

notes

that tne

occurred while Mr. Tolman

tnat the evioence was clear that Mr. Tolman had

not been drinking, thus, alconol was not a contributing factor in
the Appellant's behavior.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This Council, will apply the law of the State of Utah as set
forth in yetterl>(ii_v1 CiviX-§£CifiS§-.Q£rJl!2i&§i£D..£f-.Sajjt
145 P. £d

79£ (1945).

This Council believes that the Respondent.

Salt Lake

County Attorney's

ments

Vetterii

of

Tolrnan by the Salt

in

the facts

tne

taken,

warranted.

It

tnat

(1)

satisfied the reouire-

tne al legations against Ralph

Attorney1 s Office

the

termination

of

aric that

standard of

Tolman,

was

responsibility tnan tne

tne nigner standard of duty is evident

in tne Law Enforcement Cooe of Etnics wnerein
police officer

RalDh

Council's opinion that a law enforcement

officer is held to a hioher

that a

were not only,

but that they *^ere not controverted; (£>

is this

averace citizen

Office, has

Lake County

supoorted by
action

LsitSg^Cix^i

will keeo

an examDle to all and tnat

he will

his private

it states

in part

life unsullied as

be exemplary

in ooeying tne

laws of the lano.
This

Council

oelieves

that

tne

actions by Mr, Tolman in

regards to tne assault incident and tne vernal confrontation witn
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tne news

reporter, in

addition to

very poor judgment Dy

RalDn To1man

tne DUI arrests, demonstrate
and b n n o s

discredit to and

tarnishes tne image of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office.
The

totality

of

the

allegations

demonstrated a pattern of conduct wnicn
the

Salt

Lake

County

Attorney's

not alone

His

service.

be sufficient

but combined together, they

oresent a

RalDh

Tolrnan

merited termination from

Office.

constitute acts inimical to tne Dublic
individually may

against

actions

aid

Each alienation

to merit termination,

pattern of

misconduct DV

the Appellant which warrants the action taken.
The

relationship

between

tne

off-duty

conduct

and

Mr. Tolrnan's position as a Salt Lake County Attorney Investinator
was

clear.

Certainly,

a

police

officer or County Attorney's

Investigator has a higher duty to obey tne lawn than
Averagi

Uftun

citizen.

off-dutv

attention of the public which
service or

in this

conduct

casts

a

is

Door

that of the

brought
imaoe

to

upon

the

PUPIIC

case rhe Salt Lane County Attorney's Office,

tne agency is justified in tne termination action.
This Council is not persuaced nor
support the

contentions of

oo we

find any

facts to

tne Appellant that ne was terrninateo

as a result of his political support of a local candiaate or tnat
nis actions
No

facts

should be
were

excused oecause

presented

to

snow

ne nad consumed aiconoi.

tnat

Ralpn

Tolrnan

was an

alcoholic.
In

fact,

the

Council

conduces

tnat

aiconoi • is

contributing factor to Mr. Tolrnan's unprofessional conduct.
conclusion

is

pasea

upon

not a
Tnis

comparing tne mcicent of tne veroal

-6-

excnange

oetween

Mr. To1man

with

tne

news reoorter wnere the

Appellant had not been Drinking to tne mciaents
acquaintance

wnere

he

been

had

with the female

arinkinn, demonstrate lack of

judgment and conduct unbecoming a police officer.
DECISION
This

Council,

therefore,

Re5Donaerit' s allegations

unanimously

are suDportaole

finas

bv the

that

the

facts and that

the sanctions imposed of termination were warrantee.

3 /uL day

of DepefiTTSfe^, 19S&.

J3 (ftr^

SHERRI R. GUYON/Cha*ir

'

WILLARD J. HtTKiER/Vice-Chair

ROBERTAS. "^AmS/NernDer

**&

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I npreoy certify tnat I nave rnaiiea a true and exact coDy of
the foregoing Finaings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision
to Zane Gill, counsel for Appellant: Jerry CamDOeli, counsel for
DeDartrnent, ana J- D. Johnson, Director of tne County nurnan
Resources Division, this ^"^ day of December. 196£.
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BECBVEB
•L. Zane Gill
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for Grievant
50 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 328-1666

OCT 22 1986
COUNTY ATTCRNEv
CIVIL DIVISION

BEFORE THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL
In the matter of the grievance of
STATEMENT OF
ISSUES BY
GRIEVANT

RALPH TOLMAN,
Grievant,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,
Respondent.

Grievant, Ralph Tolman, submits this Statement of Issues
by and through L. Zane Gill, attorney for the Utah Public
Employees' Association.

ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Was Grievant terminated by the Salt Lake County
Attorneyfs Office for just cause?

2. If not, what d i s c i p l i n e , i f any, i s appropriate?
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Ralph Tolman has been an investigator in the Salt Lake
County Attorneyfs office since January 25, 1971.

During that

time he has consistently received at least standard and above
standard performance evaluations.

A review of his personnel

file shows that he has never received any documented discipline
for anything.

On about September 8, 1986, Mr. Tolman was informed by
letter under the signature of former Salt Lake County Attorney
Ted Cannon that his employment with Salt Lake County was being
terminated for "acts inimical to public service."

Mr. Tolman

initiated this grievance and has timely processed all
administrative steps leading to this appeal before the Career
Service Council.

A hearing was held by the department representative, C.
Don Harmon, on about September 12, 1986.

Mr. Tolman was not

allowed to be represented by counsel at that hearing.

Upon

advice of counsel, Mr. Tolman attended but did not present
testimony or evidence.

The initial decision to terminate

conveyed in the September 8, 1986 letter was upheld, and Mr.
Tolman!s employment was terminated effective September 19, 1986.

ToJman Statement of Issues
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The September 8, 1986 letter (the termination letter)
listed seven incidents which were allegedly acts inimical to
public service as contained in Salt Lake County Policies and
Procedures (P&P) No. 5715.

Each of those incidents is discussed

below in conjunction with a brief discussion of why each is
insufficient basis to support termination.

BORDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF

This is a discipline-related personnel action.
agency bears the burden of proof on all matters.

The

The proper

standard of proof is preponderance of evidence or higher.

The

consequences to Mr. Tolman of being terminated for the acts
alleged could include stigmatization in the public.

This is

particularly true due to the media attention already given to
the events giving rise to this hearing.

It is proper for the

Career Service Council to apply a higher standard of proof due
to the severity of stigmatization possible.
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EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The Career Service Council has the authority to exclude
everyone from the hearing room not presently giving testimony.
This must include the press as well.

Mr. Tolman would ask that

all witnesses be admonished against discussing their testimony
with anyone else, including the press.

ELEMENTS OF THE AGENCY'S BURDEN

It is fundamental that three points must be proved by
the agency to the required level of persuasion in order for it
to prevail in this hearing:
1) It must prove that the alleged acts
inimical to public service actually occurred;

2) It must prove that there is sufficient
nexus between those acts and the efficiency
of the service to sustain the termination;
and

3). It must prove that the penalty chosen for
the alleged misconduct is appropriate.

Tplman Statement of Issues
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See, Parsons v. Department of Air Force, 707F 2d 1406
(D.C. Cir. 1983) [This case illustrates the nexus requirement in
every adverse action case.

It is the standard used in the

Federal Merit System]

Most of the acts mentioned in the termination letter are
alleged to have occurred during off-duty hours.

It is the

burden of the agency to show convincingly that the alleged offduty acts affect the efficiency of the agency.

It is not the

province of the Career Service Council nor the agency to promote
morality instead of efficiency.

This is made clear by Judge

Bazelon in Norton v. Macy, 417 F 2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969):

The notion that it could be an appropriate function of
the federal bureaucracy to enforce the majorityfs
conventional codes of conduct in the private lives of
its employees is at war with elementary concepts of
liberty, privacy, and diversity.

A finding that an employee has done something immoral or
indecent could'support a dismissal without further
inquiry only-if*all immoral or indecent acts of an
employee have some ascertainable deleterious effect on
the efficiency of the service.

-Tolman Statement of- Issues
Page 6

Thus, appellee is now obliged to rely solely on this
possibility of embarrassment to the agency to justify
appellant's dismissal.

The assertion of such a nebulous

"cause" poses perplexing problems for a review
proceeding which must accord broad discretion to the
Commission. . . . [I]f the possibility of such
transitory institutional discomfiture must be
uncritically accepted as a cause for discharge which
will "promote the efficiency of the service," we might
as well abandon all pretense that the statute provides
any substantive security for its supposed beneficiaries.
. . . A reviewing court must at least be able to discern
some reasonably foreseeable, specific connection between
an employee's potentially embarrassing conduct and the
efficiency of the service.

CONDONATION AND PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS

Termination is the most drastic discipline available.
It is the administrative equivalent of .the death penalty.

It is

inherent in basic concepts of due process that a merit covered
employee be given fair notice of the potential for termination.

Tolman Statement of Issues
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Where, as In this case, an employee is given periodic
performance evaluations, it is the duty of the agency to
indicate deficiencies in performance.

If the employee is not

informed that his actions could lead to his termination, it is
not fair to suddenly tell him that his actions were, in fact,
very detrimental to the agency and that he must now be fired.

As recently as July 30, 1986, Mr. Tolman was told by his
agency that his performance was above standard.

Mr. Tolman

received a merit pay increase on about that date.

Two short

months later Mr. Tolman was fired for acts dating back as far as
five years.

The Utah Personnel Review Board has recently ruled

that where a performance evaluation did not mention acts which
were later given as grounds for termination, those acts were
irrelevant and deemed condoned or forgiven in a subsequent
termination action. See, Grievance of Mildred Martinez v.
Attorney General's Office, 5 P.R.B./H.O. 68, Order dated October
16, 1986.

The agency in this case should not be allowed to
introduce evidence or raise charges predating.the July 30, 1986,
performance appraisal.
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PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

It is alleged that Mr. Tolman was arrested for DUI on
August 18, 1986•

To date Mr, Tolman has been convicted of

nothing in regard to that event.

Mr. Tolman is entitled by our

Constitution to be considered innocent until proven guilty.

Mr.

Tolman also has a constitutionally protected property interest
in his continued employment which cannot be taken from him
without due process and equal protection of the law.
already been fired for an unproved event.

He has

Mr. Tolman1s civil

rights have already been violated.

POLITICAL MOTIVATION

As was stated in Mr. Tolman1s notice of grievance, his
termination has been politically motivated.

His evidence will

show that because of his role in certain highly controversial
and publicized cases involving the County Attorney's office he
became the target of a long term, purposeful campaign to get rid
of him.

Tolman Statement of Issues
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SELECTIVE DISCIPLINE

Other present and former employees of the County
Attorney's office have been convicted of the same acts alleged
against Mr. Tolman here.
acts.

None of them was terminated for those

Mr. Tolman is entitled to equal treatment under the

County merit system.

PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE

It is a terminating agency's affirmative obligation to
take the least drastic steps to correct troublesome behavior.

For most offenses, management is expected to use a
system of progressive discipline under which the
employee is warned or given disciplinary suspensions
before being hit with the ultimate penalty of
discharge.

A common pattern is: oral warning, written

warning, disciplinary layoff, and discharge.

77 LA 207, 72 LA 1285., 72 LA 350, 60 LA 656.
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SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS

1. Reckless driving on June 5, 1981.

This was an off-

duty event which had no bearing at all on Mr. Tolman!s
performance of his job duties.

There was no suspension given.

There was no written warning given.

This event is too far in

the past to be relevant even if it were work connected.

Mr.

Tolman has received regular standard and above evaluations
including regular merit pay increases.

No mention has been made

of this event anywhere until now.

2. Sage Lounge incident, 1983.

This was an off-duty

event which had no bearing at all on Mr. Tolmanfs performance of
his job duties.

No charges were ever brought, no arrest made.

There was no suspension given.
given.

There was no written warning

This event is too far in the past to be relevant even if

it were work connected.

Mr. Tolman has received regular

standard and above evaluations including regular merit pay
increases.

No mention has been made of this event anywhere

until now.

3. August 18, 1986 arrest.

This, has been discussed

above under Presumption of Innocence.

Tolman Statement of Issues
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4. June 10, 1986 incident with Margo Bergvall.

This was

an off-duty event which had no bearing at all on Mr, Tolman1s
performance of his job duties.

No charges were ever brought, no

arrest made. There was no suspension given.
written warning given.

There was no

Mr. Tolman has received a regular above

standard evaluation including a regular merit pay increase since
the event.

No mention has been made of this event anywhere

until now.

5. Personal use of County vehicle.

Mr. Tolman and

others will present evidence on this point (and those listed
above and below) at the hearing.

Mr. Tolman expects to be

treated the same in this regard as all other employees of his
office.

There was no suspension given.

warning given.

There was no written

Mr. Tolman has received a regular above standard

evaluation including a regular merit pay increase since the
event.

No mention has been made of this event anywhere until

now.

6. Confrontation with John Harrington.

Mr. Harrington

will be called as a witness in support of Mr._ Tolman on this
point. There was no suspension given.
warning given.

There was no written

Mr. Tolman has received a regular above standard

evaluation including a regular merit pay increase since the

Tolman Statement of Issues
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event.

No mention has been made of this event anywhere until

now.

7. Lying to a supervisor in September 1982.
no suspension given.

There was

There was no written warning given.

event is too far in the past to be relevant.

This

Mr. Tolman has

received regular standard and above evaluations Including
regular merit pay increases.

No mention has been made of this

event anywhere until now.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above and for reasons to be
discussed in the pre-hearing, all charges against Mr. Tolman
must be dismissed.

Mr. Tolman should be reinstated with full

back pay and benefits as a matter of law.

The Career Service

Council should award Mr. Tolman a reasonable attorney's fee and
all other costs of this action.

Respectfully submitted this Q-2^~day
October, 1986.

°^

©ffice of % ^aii llake (Eavcntv Aiiormm v # ? % \
T.L. "TED" CANNON
County Attorney

M I C H A E L N. M A R T I N E Z
Ch«< Deputy County Attorney

M E M O R A N D U M
C O N

TO:

F IDE N T I A L

Bill Hyde

FROM:

Jerry Campbell

DATE:

September 4, 198 6

This memorandum is in regards
action to be taken against Ralph Tolman.

to

the

disciplinary

After review of the file in the investigators office
and the file in the personnel office of the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office, it is my opinion tliat a dismissal action
against Ralph Tolman would not be successful. The reasons for
my opinion are as follows:
The first obstacle is Salt Lake County Policy 5715
which states "that the usual sequence of discipline shall be
verbal warning, written warning, suspension and termination.
Deviation from procedures may be justified depending on the
severity
and
the
circumstances
of the action(s) to be
disciplined."
In order to side step the issue of progressive
discipline, the argument must be made that the discipline taken
was justified because of the actions of Ralph Tolman.
performance
The
second
hurdle
is Ralph Tolman1s
evaluations.
A review of the performance evaluation are as
follows: In July of 1986 he received a performance evaulation
of 77.2% of potential which is above standard.
On January's

231 East 4th South
Q Administration
Roger A Livingston
Chief Deputy County Attorney
for Administrative Affairs

O County Attorney Victim Services
Julie Branch
Director
4th Floor

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Q Justice Division
Walter R Ellett
Chief Deputy
3rd Floor

(801) 363-7900

D Investigative Agency
Don H*rm*n
Special Agent in Charge
4th

FIAAT

D Civil Division
William R Hyde
Chief Deputy
<i<ui e n ~ ~ . -

Q Governmental Services
Donald Sawaya
Chief Deputy
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evaluation he received a 73% of standard which is above
standard.
In July of 1985, he received a score of 78* and
January 1985 received a score of 73%. It is true that his
scores for performance evaluations were the lowest of the
investigators, however, they were consistently above standard.
A typical evaluation comment is that Ralph is constantly
striving to improve his performance or that Ralph is a good
employee with
good
basic skills.
Thus, the performance
evaluations which reflect an employee's performance while on
duty would not help in a disciplinary action against Mr. Tolman.
The third hurdle is lack of documentary discipline
evidence.
Two items were found in the files which contains
written reprimands.
On December 2, 1982, John T. Nielsen
placed Ralph Tolman on informal probation for a period of six
months with the reprimand to be removed after six months, if
there were no further occurrences. On September 28, 1982, John
T. reprimanded Ralph for misrepresenting to Neil Boswell that
he transported a witness from the airport to a motel. Since
1982, there have been no written disciplinary actions taken
against Ralph Tolman.
In reference
are as follows:

to

the allegations

of misconduct,

they

The first D.U.I, arrest occurred in June of 1981
wherein the Utah Highway Patrol arrested Ralph and the
breathalizer test showed .11' to .12% alcohol. He plead to a
lesser included offense of reckless driving.
It should be
noted that at the same time that Ralph was arrested for a
D.U.I, a similar case' was pending against John Christensen,
another investigator of this office. John Christensen was not
terminated from this office based upon his D.U.I, accident and,
therefore, Don Sawaya likewise did not terminate Ralph Tolman.
In a meeting with Ralph Tolman,. Don verbally warned him that
any further action would be grounds for disciplinary action.
This warning was not reduced to writing nor was it placed in
his file. Additionally, Ralph was suspended for five days, but
those five days were deducted from his corap-time that he had
accrued as of that date. The second D.U.I, was not brought to
this office1s attention until after his third D.U.I, arrest.
The second D.U.I, incident occurred two years ago in Midvale,
where a Sergeant Tim Short of the Midvale Police Department
stopped Ralph and his wife after they had left the Sage
Lounge. Sergeant Short did not arrest Ralph but allowed him to
obtain other transportation. The third D.U.I, arrest of August
8, 1986 is currently pending.
All of the above D.U.I, arrests occurred off duty.
The first arrest occurred in a county vehichle, the other two
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did not. The crucial question is how do the arrests relate to
Ralph's performance as a County Attorney Investigator* and has
this office set a pattern that a D.U.I, will only result in a
suspension. Because his performance evaluations do not reflect
any significant problems, his D.U.I, arrests have not affected
his performance as a Salt Lake County investigator.
In reference to the incidences with Margo Bergwall and
her friends, Ralph's conduct deserves some disciplinary action
by this office.
Unfortunally. these incidences were not
brought to our attention at the time that they occurred.
Because this office was not made aware of the incidences at the
time they occurred the severity of the behavior is dimished.
At best, a charge of criminal trespass with assault and battery
could be made against Ralph for these particular incidences.
Again, it would be necessary to relate his irrational behavior
to
his
performance
as
a
Salt
Lake
County
Attorney
investigator.
Finally, the last allegation is that Ralph violated a
direct order of a supervisor. All Investigators were notified
not to use their county vehicles on the weekends.
Ralph's
odometer indicated he had driven his vehicle approximately 80
miles on two weekends with no reasonable explanation.
Certainly, some disciplinary action should be taken
against Ralph Tolman. Since the time he was suspended in 1981
to the current D.U.I, charge, presents a problem of how long can
a department hold a warning of termination over an .employee's
head. All memos and incidences concerning Ralph's action show
little evidence that Ralph was ever actually delivered a
written reprimand or warning. Certainly, the employee has a
right to receive written notice. Should a disciplinary action
be taken against Ralph, he has the right to have that notice in
writing
stating
that
such conduct
will
result
in his
termination.
Our files lack that notice to Ralph Tolman;
i.e.,
that future conduct will result in a termination.
Therefore, I believe that the proper course would be to await
outcome of the trial of the D.U.I, arrest of August 1986; to
continue his leave with pay status. After the trial, suspend
him for a period of 30 days without pay and to refer him to the
employee alcohol referral service of Salt Lake County. Most
importantly, give Ralph an official warning that any further
conduct of this sort will result in his immediate termination
and place this warning in his personnel file in our office and
at O.P.M. Then, if any further acts occur, termination would
be sustainable.
0922J
pc: Don Harmon*/'
Don Sawaya
Sam Dawson

